Rutgers Mini-Conference on Multiverse, Theodicy, and Fine-Tuning

Metro Area Philosophers of Science,

 

I’m writing on behalf of Dean Zimmerman to invite you to a two-day pre-read workshop (June 10-11, 2016) at Rutgers University on the intersection of philosophy of physics and philosophy of religion. Our two topics are: (1) Everettian Multiverse and the problem of evil; (2) the use of probability in the fine-tuning arguments for design. Please see below for the abstracts.

Our main speakers and commentators include:

Jason Turner (Arizona)

Hans Halvorson (Princeton)

Christopher Weaver (UIUC)

Robin Collins (Messiah)

Barry Loewer (Rutgers)

Cian Dorr (NYU)

Valia Allori (NIU)

Timothy O’Connor (Indiana-Bloomington)

David Albert (Columbia)

 

Organizers:

Dean Zimmerman (Rutgers)
Eddy Keming Chen (Rutgers)

Thanks to the generosity of the Rutgers Center for the Philosophy of Religion and the Templeton Foundation, the Rutgers Philosophy Department will be hosting the workshop on Friday-Saturday, June 10-11, at the 5th Floor Seminar Room, 106 Somerset Street, New Brunswick, NJ. The program is forthcoming. Please feel free to forward the message to interested students and colleagues.

 

Due to limited space in the seminar room, if you’d like to attend the conference, please RSVP by June 1. You will receive the pre-read papers by Jason Turner and by Hans Halvorson. Please send an email titled “RSVP Multiverse” to my email address at: eddy.chen@rutgers.edu

===========ABSTRACTS================

Title: Everettian Quantum Mechanics and Evil

Author: Jason Turner

Abstract: The problem of evil has been around for a long time: How can an all-powerful and all-good God allow evil of the sorts we see in the world? If the Everettian interpretation of quantum mechanics is correct, though, then there is a lot more evil in the world than what we see. This suggest a second problem of evil: If Everettianism is true, how can an all-powerful and all-good God allow evil of the sort we don’t see? If the original problem of evil already pushed you into atheism, worries about Everettianism aren’t likely to make much difference. On the other hand, even if you have reconciled the evils we know about with theism to your satisfaction, you may be troubled by the extra Everettian evils. These evils, I will argue, pose an extra challenge for theism. I do not say the challenge cannot be met; some extant responses to the old problem of evil, if successful, may work against the new problem, too. But some won’t. As a result, the challenge is strictly harder: every solution to it is also a solution to the old problem of evil, but not every solution to the old problem of evil is a solution to it.

Title: A Probability Problem in the Fine-Tuning Argument

Author: Hans Halvorson

Abstract: According to the fine-tuning argument: (i) the probability of a life-permitting universe, conditional on the non-existence of God, is low; and (ii) the probability of a life-permitting universe, conditional on the existence of God, is high. I demonstrate that these two claims cannot be simultaneously justified. In particular, if there are good reasons for a non-theist to think that the probability of a life-permitting universe is low, then these are also good reasons for a theist.